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Dividing the Pie More Evenly:

Post-Rodriguez

Judicial and Legislative Alternatives to
School Financing in Illinois
The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with
respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for
the legislative processes of various States, and we do no violence
to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our
hand. We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not
to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo
...
. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.'

With these words, a raging court battle that had focused on equality
of educational financing came to an end. The Supreme Court's five
to four decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 has deterred 3 judicial challenges to various public school financ1. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59
The Court gave several additional reasons for imposing the traditional limita(1973).
tions on its function. There was a lack of consensus over whether the poor, the racial
minorities or the children in overburdened core-city school districts would be helped or
harmed by the dismantling of the present school financing schemes. Also, there was
some evidence that any attempts to achieve equality in expenditures would lead to higher
taxation and lower educational expenditures in urban areas. Furthermore, there was a
question of whether increased spending would bring about a corresponding increase in
the level of education.
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Company, 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Supreme Court
distinguished its prior decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) in a six
to three decision. The Court held that state laws which permitted a state court
to authorize seizure of goods, without prior notice to debtor-in-possession or opportunity for hearing, upon ex parte application of creditor who asserts in a sworn
affidavit delinquency in payment and belief that debtor would "encumber, alienate or
otherwise dispose of" goods during pendency of judicial proceedings did not violate the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart criticized the opinion of the Court. He said that the case was "constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin." 416 U.S. at 634. The effect of the Court's
decision was not to distinguish the case from Fuentes but to reverse its earlier decision.
Justice Stewart said that the only perceivable change that could account for the decision
was a change in the Court's membership, rather than a change based on constitutional
principles. If Justice Stewart's analysis is correct, it is conceivable that a future change
in the Court's composition may also result in a reversal of Rodriguez, thus allowing a
resumption of challenges to school financing schemes under the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
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ing schemes brought under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.4
Challenges had been
launched in the courts against financing schemes that were heavily dependent upon the local property tax for producing school revenues.
Numerous plaintiffs had argued that it was inequitable to raise the bulk
of a school district's budget through local taxation where there existed
wide wealth disparities among school districts. The plaintiffs claimed
that funding education through local taxation was especially inequitable
to residents with the least property wealth since those residents were
also the poorest in terms of income and could not afford the costs of
an education equivalent to that provided in the more wealthy districts.
Two years have passed since the Supreme Court handed down its
opinion in the Rodriguez case. With this passage of time, it is now
appropriate to reexamine the school finance reform movement and to
discuss alternative judicial and legislative solutions. It must be stated
at the outset that this article takes the position that the most equitable
school financing scheme is one that provides equal educational opportunity to children. Though there is no precise definition of equal educational opportunity, the concept involves the basic notion that all children should be treated equally in some defined fashion. One result
of equal educational opportunity is the curtailing of the rights of an individual school district to spend as it chooses. However, arguments
have been made that school financing schemes could be reformed without restricting the rights of a school district to provide for the level of
education its residents desire.
Those who advocate equal educational opportunity seek to reform
educational financing schemes that are heavily dependent upon local
property wealth. One state using this type of financing scheme is Illinois. To place the problems and solutions of educational financing into
sharp focus, this article will examine financing of education in Illinois.
But, clearly, the discussions and conclusions stated herein have applica4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A number
of challenges were brought under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Mclnnis v. Shapiro. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), ali'd per curiam,
394 U.S. 322 (1969); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Robinson v.
Cahill. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). aff'd. 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273
(1973); cf. Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973) (prior opinion which held the Michigan financing scheme
unconstitutional was vacated); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,
337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Spano v. Board of Edu-

cation, 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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bility to all states whose school systems depend upon local wealth for
financing.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, one of the frequently used approaches to reforming school financing schemes was
through the courts. Even after Rodriguez there are still some avenues
of judicial attack open, but the focus is now on legislative change. In
discussing the financing of education, three areas will be considered.
First, an overview of school financing systems will be presented. Second, a brief summary of the past judicial challenges and current attempts at judicial reform in the state courts will be examined. Finally,
the various legislative reforms pertaining to alternative ways to raise
and distribute educational funds will be discussed.
PART

I: How SCHOOLS ARE

FINANCED

The Property Tax
In Illinois, local taxes produce 54 percent of the revenues
public school system.5 The state government provides about
cent of the school revenues through state aid programs. The
ing 6 percent of the revenues is contributed by the federal
ment.6

for the
40 perremaingovern-

Local revenue for education is produced by the property tax which
is the product of the assessed valuation of property in the district multiplied by the rate at which the community is willing to tax itself. As
a result of dependence upon local wealth for school funding, there are
great disparities among districts in the amount of money available for
education. Two districts with different property wealth may choose to
tax at the same rate, but the poorer district will raise less money than
5. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RANKINGS OF THE STATES, 1974, at 49
(1973). In 18 other states, local taxes produce an even greater percentage of the revenues for the public schools.
6. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, STATE, LOCAL AND
FEDERAL PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING FOR ILLINOIS, 1973-74, at 4 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING]. In 1973, Congress passed the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act. 31 U.S.C. 1221 et seq. Popularly known as the revenue sharing
bill, this Act provides unrestricted federal aid to the states. In the first 18 months of
the program's existence, Illinois received about $116 million. In the next 12 months,
during fiscal 1974, the state received $110 million. The estimate for fiscal year 1975
is about the same. In 1974, $110 million had been given to aid education. However,
in a telephone interview on July 2, 1974, the Illinois Director of Finance and Claims
in the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, stated that availability of the
federal revenue sharing money does not result in an increase in the educational budget
by $110 million. With federal revenue sharing money allocated to education, money
that would have been used in this area is now diverted to other state activities. The
educational share of the state budget has continued to be about 20 percent, as it was
before revenue sharing came into existence.
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the richer one. Some critics of present school financing schemes argue
that a poorer district which taxes as heavily as a richer one should receive the same revenues without regard to actual district wealth.7
These critics have urged that the amount of money available to finance
education should not be a function of the wealth of an individual district
but rather of the wealth of the state as a whole. s
During the past decade, school districts have faced acute financial
strains. Expenditures for public education rose at an annual rate of
10 percent while the average annual increase in -the market value of
real property was about 4.6 percent.9 In Illinois, from 1949 to 1970,
the average annual increase of the value of real property was 7.7 percent. But, in over half of these 22 years, the increase was less than
3.5 percent.' 0 The slow growth in the tax base has been compounded
by the growing reluctance of voters to approve increases in the school
tax rate." Another reason that the property tax is failing to produce
adequate revenue for educational purposes is 'the increase in demand
placed upon the tax to fund non-educational services, e.g. police, sanitation.
The property tax has several important advantages. Unquestionably, the property tax produces a great deal of revenue. In Illinois,
the tax accounts for 43 percent of all state and local taxes.' 2 In addition to the large amounts of money this tax produces, its stability is
highly desirable. The stability of the tax results from the fact that it
is not closely linked to short term economic fluctuations, while other
taxes, such as sales and income, will vary greatly as the economy shifts.
The infrequent reassessment of property also contributes to the stability
1
of the property tax.'
7. See pp. 128-30 infra for a discussion of an alternative distribution scheme,
termed "district power equalizing," which provides funds without regard to local district
wealth.
8.

J. COONS, W.

CLUNE AND S. SUGARMAN,

PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCA-

TION 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PRIVATE WEALTH].
9. Levin, Alternatives to the Present System of School Finance, 61 GEO. L.J. 845,
880 (1973).
10. ILL. BUREAU oF THE BUDGET, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAx 4-8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PROPERTY TAx].
11. In a telephone interview with Richard Carlson, Assistant Director of the Bureau
of the Budget for Education of Illinois, on September 5, 1974, Carlson stated that last
year over 80 percent of the budgets submitted to the voters in Illinois were rejected.
Several reasons have been offered by educators for the rejection of the budgets. One
reason advanced is that voters are discontented with higher taxes and the defeat of the
school budget is a way to manifest distaste for higher taxes. Another reason for the
rejection of the budget is the belief among voters that increases in expenditures would
be eaten up by teachers' salaries without any corresponding increase in the quality of
education.
12. PROPERTY TAx, supra note 10, at 3.
13. Id. at 8.
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Despite both its adequacy and stability, the property tax has been
the subject of widespread criticism. The primary problem has been

the regressive nature of the tax. 4 In 1967, in Illinois, property taxes

constituted 6 percent of the income of those taxpayers earning under
$2,000. As income rose, the property tax as a percentage of income
decreased until it reached 2.1 percent for those taxpayers who earned
$15,000 and over. 15 The tax has been criticized because it is inelastic'" and inefficient to administer. While stability is generally an advantage, the slow growth of the tax results in its falling behind other
taxes as a revenue producer during periods of economic growth. In
comparison, the property tax produces revenues at a slower rate than
either sales or income taxes under these conditions. 1 7 The property
tax is difficult to administer because of the subjectivity inherent in assessment. Despite objective criteria, the value of any piece of property
is what the assessor believes it to be. This subjectivity means that the
assessment ratios on different types of property vary widely among and
within assessment districts.' 8
Tax Effort and Revenue
There are two factors which determine whether a district is consid14. A regressive tax is one where persons with lower incomes pay a higher percentage of income in taxes than those with higher incomes. Taxes may also be progressive
or proportional. A progressive tax requires persons with higher incomes to pay a higher
percentage of their incomes in taxes than those with less income. A proportional tax
requires everyone to pay the same percentage of their income in taxes.
15.
OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
SUPERINTENDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL FINANCE 96 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as FINAL REPORT].
16. PROPERTY TAX, supra note 10, at 19. The measure economists use to judge the
responsiveness of a tax in producing revenue as the amount of income grows on a national scale is the "coefficient of elasticity." The coefficient of elasticity of a tax is ob-

tained by computing between two years, the percentage increase in revenues of a tax,

the percentage increase in income (often in terms of the gross national product) and
then dividing the former by the latter. For example, if between two years, revenues
from a tax increased 4 percent while personal income increased 5 percent, the coefficient
of elasticity of this tax would be .04/.05 = .8. For this tax, a 1 percent increase in
personal income would generate an .8 percent increase in revenues. Where the coefficient of elasticity is less than one, the tax is said to be inelastic; greater than one, elastic
and one, unitary elasticity. The following is a table of taxes with their elasticity
ranges:
Tax
Elasticity Range
Individual Income
1.5 - 1.80
General Sales
.9 - 1.05
Property
.7 - 1.10
17. Id. See ILL. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, ALTERNATIVE REVENUE SOURCES FOR FINANCING ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY

EDUCATION IN ILLINOIS

cited as REVENUE SOURCES].

18.

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOLS, A NEW DESIGN:

TIVE EDUCATION IN ILLINOIS

6 (1972)

[hereinafter

FINANCING FOR EFFEC-

43-45 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NEW DESIGN].

In Cook
County, the assessed values of property vary widely. The median assessment for a residential home was 22 percent of market value; for a modern apartment, 27 percent; for
an old style combination store and apartment building, 42 percent; and for vacant land,
13 percent.
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ered rich or poor in the area of school finance: (1) overall wealth of
the school district, and (2) the number of students residing in the district. Thus, district wealth is always measured in terms of property
wealth per pupil. With respect to the first factor, there are wide disparities in property wealth among school districts. In Illinois, in 1972,
assessed valuations per pupil for elementary districts ranged from
$5,388 to $403,024; for secondary districts, $23,945 to $246,980; for
unit districts, $3,544 to $101,908.19 The wide disparities in assessed
valuation per pupil among districts enable the wealthier ones to raise
revenue more easily than the others. A tax rate of $1 per $100 of
assessed valuation, in the wealthiest elementary district in Illinois, produces almost 75 times the revenue per pupil as the same tax rate in
the poorest district.2" In secondary districts, the ratio is 10:1 and in
unit districts, 28:1.21 But the second factor, the number of pupils within
a school district, is equally significant in explaining wealth disparities
among districts. A community may have a large amount of wealth behind each pupil because a large industrial concern is located in the district, and there are only a few school age children. Other districts may
consist of primarily residential property with many school age children.
Though wealth per pupil is important in determining the amount of
money available to finance education, the local tax rate also plays an
important role. There is as great a variation in tax rates as there is
in local wealth. In 1970-71, in Illinois, rates for unit districts ranged
from $.80 to $3.09; for elementary districts, from $.36 to $2.68; and
for secondary districts, from $.67 to $2.33.22 Yet, the situation is not
ameliorated by a greater tax effort on the part of poorer districts. Even
when the poor districts tax themselves at much greater rates, these districts usually cannot raise as much money as the richer districts.2" In
part, poorer districts cannot tax above certain maximums. 24 In addi19. Id. at 30. The public schools in Illinois are organized to provide instruction in
either the elementary or secondary grades or both. School districts offering education
in kindergarten through eighth grade are elementary districts; those offering eduzation
in grades 9 through 12 are secondary districts. Districts which educate their children
in grades K-12 are unit districts.
20. Id.
21.
22.

Id.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 21.
23. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOLS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXCELLENCE
109-81 (1973) [hereinaf'er cited as OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXCELLENCE1. Six representative elementary districts in Cook County, Illinois illustrate that, generally, poorer school
districts tax at a higher rate but produce less money per pupil.
Assessed
Operating
Total
Valuation
Expenditures
School District
Tax Rate
Per Pupil
Per Pupil
Rich
Rosemont S.D. 78
1.556
$128,879
$1342.03
Rhodes S.D. 84-5
1.450
$103,417
$1099.40
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tion, poor districts simply could not tax at the confiscatory rates neces25
sary to provide the resources that the richer districts can raise.
State Contributionto School Revenues
(a) Flat Grant
State governments became involved with educational financing in the
earliest phases of the common school movement. 26 The earliest and
simplest form of state aid was the flat grant which consisted of an absolute number of dollars distributed to a school district on a per pupil
basis. 27 In Illinois, for 1974, each school district was guaranteed $48
per pupil.2
The flat grant program inadequately compensates for the disparities
in wealth among school districts. To provide a sufficient level of education, the local district must raise the bulk of the funds needed.29 Under this program, poorer districts are disadvantaged since they must tax
at a higher rate than wealthy districts in order to raise the additional
money. 0
Skokie Fairview S.D. 72
1.250
$119,402
$1351.37
Poor
Maywood S.D. 89
2.092
$ 27,361
$ 903.15
Palos C.C.S.D. 118
3.020
$ 25,705
$ 945.26
Kirby S.D. 140
3.226
$ 9,529
$ 627.37
24. PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING, supra note 6, at 22. The school districts are required
to obtain voter approval to tax above certain rates.
SCHOOL DISTRICT TAX RATE LIMITATIONS 1973-74
(Chicago District #299 not included)
Without
With
Levy
District
Referendum Referendum
Type
(%)
(%)
Educational Fund
K-8
0.920
3.00
9-12
0.920
3.00
K-12
1.600
4.00
Operations, Building, and
K-8
0.250
0.55
Maintenance Fund
9-12
0.250
0.55
K-12
0.375
0.75
Capital Improvements Fund
All Districts
0.000
0.06
25. NEW DESIGN, supra note 18, at 30.
26. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXCELLENCE, supra note 23, at 1.
27. Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of
Serrano and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504, 507 (1972).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, § 18-8 (1973).
29. PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 8, at 55.
30. Id. at 56. For example, under the flat grant system of State A, $55 is given
per child. Two districts, the wealthy one with a total valuation of $1000 and the poor
one with a total valuation of $100, decide to spend $100 per child. Each will have to
raise $45 locally. The poor district would have to tax at 45 percent of its total assets.
The rich can tax at 4.5 percent of its assets to raise that amount. If the poor district
taxes at the 4.5 percent rate, it would have only $59.50 to spend while the rich district,
taxing at the same rate, would have $100. It can be seen that the flat grant has no
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(b) FoundationProgram

In the early 1900's, legislatures began to realize that certain school
districts had an abundance of money to spend on education while other
districts could barely afford to support any type of educational program.
It was clear that the flat grant per pupil was not providing adequate
funding for all school districts.
In 1927, in Illinois, a state equalization or foundation program of
school aid was inaugurated. 31 The program operated on the premise
that each student should be guaranteed some basic, or adequate, level
of education. This program assured each district a certain level of
spending. Each district had the option of taxing at higher rates if it
chose to spend more money on education. The first foundation guarantee was $34 per pupil. By the 1975-76 school year, the guarantee
could reach $1260 per pupil.3 2
There are three basic elements in any foundation plan. First, there
is the aid per unit which is usually calculated in terms of pupils in average daily attendance. The program usually adds a weighting factor to
account for the particularized costs of certain types of pupils, e.g., the
physically handicapped."3 Second, the local district must tax itself at
a certain level to qualify for the program. This tax level is commonly
called the qualifying rate. Third, the state must4 adopt some reasonable
means of raising money, e.g., a state income tax.3
impact on the relative ability of the poor district to raise money. A decision to raise
$45 still takes the same sacrifice as though the flat grant never existed.
31. NEW DESIGN, supra note 18, at 29.
32. See pp. 133-34 infra.
33. ILL. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, SUPERINTENDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL FINANCE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 3, at 22-23
(1972).
When the state provides financial aid, it is on the basis of students in average
daily attendance. The district receives so many dollars per pupil. To compensate for
the higher costs of educating certain pupils, a weighting factor is assigned to these pupils.
For example:

Student

Weight

Elementary
Special Ed. for Handicapped
Remedial and Compensatory
High School
34. PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 8, at 66-68. In Illinois,
of this formula is:
AV

G = (520 -

QR X

WADA

G
520
QR
AV
WADA
FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 7.

-

2.000
2.100
2.120
3.000
the simplified expression

)

State aid
Foundation guarantee
Qualifying rate
Assessed valuation
Weighted students in average daily attendance
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Once a district taxes at the qualifying rate, the amount raised by that
district will be supplemented by the state to provide the difference between what is raised and what is guaranteed. If a 1 percent tax raises
$400 per pupil, and the foundation level is $500, the state will give
$100 per pupil to that district. To preserve local incentive to spend
for the level of education desired, the district can tax at more than the
minimum rate. ' 5
It is this part of the plan-the guarantee of local incentive-which
critics contend is the fundamental flaw in the foundation formula and
prevents it from guaranteeing equal educational opportunity. 6 The
formula does not produce equal funding at various tax rates. The state
will only pay the foundation guarantee. A poor district which taxes
at a very heavy rate will not be rewarded for its extra taxation. Because the state will not give additional funds above the amount of aid
produced at the qualifying rate, a property-rich district can produce
more money for every dollar it taxes above the minimum rate than a
poor district can raise by taxing at that same rate. Consequently, for
every dollar of taxes above the minimum rate, the disparity in educational funds between a rich and poor district increases.3 7 Despite the
intentions of the legislature, the foundation program does not decrease
wealth disparities.3"
(c) Combined Program-Flatand FoundationAid
Typically, the foundation program operates in combination with a
flat grant plan. In some states, the flat grant portion dominates, while
35. PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 8, at 64.
36. Id. at 65. There are other reasons why the foundation plans have not been particularly successful. First, state aid, which is equalization aid, accounts for less than
50 percent of the total educational expenditures in 33 of the 50 states. In Illinois, the
state supplied 42 percent of the costs in 1974. Second, most states give a flat grant
to every child. By giving such aid regardless of a district's fiscal capacity, the wealth
disparity between districts is maintained. Third, the formulas do not really consider the
fiscal needs of a district. It is a district's income level which plays the vital role in
the ability of a district to tax itself. Finally, there are two factors to consider under
an equalization formula: the qualifying rate and the foundation level. The qualifying
rate is often increased at the same rate as the foundation guarantee. The failure to raise
the tax rate has diverted money to rich districts. Yet, it is as common to find that both
factors have been kept low despite the rise in educational costs. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

OF

PUBLIC

INSTRUCTION,

SUPERINTENDENT'S

SCHOOL FINANCE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 1,
SIONAL PAPER No. 1].
37. PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 8, at 65.

at 7 (1972)

ADVISORY

COMMITTEE

ON

[hereinafter cited as OCCA-

38. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 4. Though there is no single accepted method
of measuring the equalizing effect of aid formulas, one descriptive statistic that has been
widely accepted is the Gini Coefficient. An analysis over a six year period, from 196571, showed that the equalization programs in Illinois have had only a limited effect in
reducing wealth disparities. Changes in the present aid formula are needed if there is
ever to be a significant reduction in the wealth disparity between districts.
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in others, the opposite is true. Besides these two funding schemes,
states have adopted percentage equalization plans, guaranteed valuation and full state funding to finance school systems. 1
One common flat grant/foundation plan which has been used in Illinois 0 subtracts the flat grant per pupil from the total aid the district
is entitled to receive per pupil. Assume the state guarantee is $400
per pupil and two districts tax at the required qualifying rate. This
tax produces $300 per pupil for the rich district and $100 for the poor
district. In this instance, the poor district receives the following:
$100 (flat grant) ± ($500 (founation) - [($100) locally produced) + ($100) (flat grant)]) - $400 (state aid).
The rich district receives:
$100 + ($500 - [$300 + $100]) = $200.
Both districts have a total of $400 to spend per pupil. But, under this
formula, for every dollar the poor district receives in flat grand aid, it
must give up a dollar of foundation aid. Without the flat grant portion,
the poor district would still have received $300 in state aid through the
foundation program."'
In the above example, itwas assumed that both districts taxed at the
minimum qualifying rate and produced less than the state guarantee.
Both districts had the same amount of money to spend per pupil, although the amount of state aid varied. A completely different result
takes place when the rich district produces more dollars than the state
guarantee at the minimum qualifying rate. For example, if the rich
district produced the $400 foundation guarantee when it taxed a the
required rate, itwould not be entitled to any state equalization aid.
However, it would still be entitled to the $100 flat grant per pupil.
The rich district now would have a total of $500 per pupil. The poor
district would have only $400 per pupil. The extra money is due solely
to the flat grant. The poor district loses money under this plan, since
for every dollar it receives through the flat grant, it loses one dollar
from the foundation guarantee. The poor district will only receive the
foundation guarantee. The rich district will receive the flat grant, even
if not entitled to foundation money. Therefore, the rich district is
guaranteed more money under the combined flat grant/foundation
type program than under a foundation program without the flat grant.
Under this combined plan, since some aid always goes to the wealthier
39.

U.S.

41.

Id. at 110-11.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION,

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS, 1971-72, at 5 (1972).
40. See PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 8, at 126-48.
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districts, the effect is not a reduction, but actually an increase in the
disparity in wealth among districts. The combined plan is in fact a subsidy for the rich.4 2 The underlying premise of the foundation program

is to use the minimum qualifying rate to bring about equalization in
funds despite wealth disparity.
achieve this basic goal.4"

The combined program does not even

Summary of Part I
On the local level, school revenue is raised through the property tax.
This tax is a highly productive and stable means of generating revenue.
But it has been criticized for being regressive, inelastic, and expensive
to administer. The tax is also burdensome to the taxpayer, since the
rates must be sufficient to adequately fund educational as well as noneducational services. There are two factors to consider in discussing
the property tax: the assessed valuation of property and the tax rate.
Because of the vast differences in assessed valuation per pupil among
school districts, property-poor districts must tax at a much higher rate
to raise money on a comparable scale with the property-rich districts.
Yet, even high tax rates still leave these districts far behind the richer
ones in terms of money available for education. The inequality of resources is ameliorated to some extent by the state. The two most com-

mon funding schemes have been the flat grant and foundation type of
programs. However, neither has compensated successfully for the disparities in local wealth.
42. Id. at 111-12.
43. Id. at 70-71. There is one further problem involving the foundation formula
which must be discussed. In deciding how to fairly divide the annual legislative appropriation to education so that state dollars will have an equalizing effect, a key school
district must be selected. It has already been explained that to participate in the foundation program a district must tax at a qualifying rate. Certain districts have such a high
assessed valuation per pupil that when these districts tax at the qualifying rate they will
raise so much money that they will not be entitled to receive money under the foundation program. The key district is that district in the state where the residents tax themselves at the qualifying rate, and the amount raised is exactly the amount of money that
they would be entitled to under the foundation program.
If the legislature selects a key district with an assessed valuation that is only of average wealth, the financing plan can never be equalizing. For taxation by the richer districts, even at the minimum rate, will produce more funds than the poor districts could
receive under the foundation formula. This happens because the state only adds funds
to equal the amount of the foundation level. A decision to tax above that rate may
produce more money for the poor district. But the state will not give it added help because it has chosen to make a greater tax effort.
If the legislature selects a key district which is richer than the richest district in the
state (this, of course, is only a hypothetical district created for purposes of the formula)
poorer districts will also be hurt. Then, if every district chooses to tax at the minimum rate, all will be entitled to state aid. No single district produces the foundation
guarantee at the minimum tax rate. As a result, the state pays money to those districts
which really do not need it instead of using the money to further compensate the poorer
districts. This money has a non-equalizing effect.
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JUDICIAL CHALLENGES

TO SCHOOL FINANCING -SCHEMES

The wealth disparity problem is an old one. In the early 1900's,
legislatures enacted laws to correct the differences in wealth among districts. However, by the mid-sixties, it became clear that legislative solutions were not working because pupils and parents began to sue in
federal and state courts challenging the constitutionality of school financing schemes.
44
The first challenge to the system was brought in Illinois in 1968.
Three years later, the California Supreme Court rocked the nation
when it decided Serrano v. Priest.4 5 The state supreme court declared
the school financing programs unconstitutional under both the federal
and state constitutions. 46 This case was the highwater mark of school
finance litigation. Finally, in 1973, the United States Supreme Court
ended further challenges to school finance litigation brought under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 47 the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that they had been discriminated
against on the basis of property wealth, that education was a fundamental interest, and that the State of Texas was required to show a
compelling state interest to justify the continuation of a school financing scheme that was based heavily on local property wealth.
With respect to the claim that the Texas financing scheme discriminated on the basis of wealth, the Court stated that the plaintiffs had
failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate that they were a disadvantaged class "susceptible of identification in traditional terms" of
44. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968), ajf'd per curiam, 394
U.S. 322 (1969). A number of students filed suit claiming that various state statutes
pertaining to the financing of public schools violated the Constitution since the statutes
permitted wide variations in the expenditures per student from district to district. Acknowledging that inequality existed, the court said that before a statute would be declared unconstitutional under an equal protection attack, the plaintiffs must show that
the classification rests on grounds that are wholly irrelevant to a valid state purpose.
Tested by this standard, the court found that the statutes were designed to allow localities to determine the amount of education they wanted to provide. This decision to allow such local decision-making was a valid state purpose, especially, since the legislature
had provided a min;mum level of education through the fou-idation program.
45. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
46. A class action was brought by students against certain state and county officials
responsible for the financing of public schools. The plaintiffs claimed that the financing
plans failed to meet the equal protection requirements of the federal and state constitutions. Finding both a suspect classification in terms of wealth discrimnation and the
impingement of a fuidamental interest, failure to provide a sufficient level of education,
the court decided that the compelling state interest test was applicable to determine
whether or not the California financing scheme was unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions. This decision was based on the assumption that the plaintiffs had proved their allegations at the trial court level.
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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wealth discrimination. 48 In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that education was a fundamental interest, the Court stated that it had failed
to find any explicit or implicit right to education guaranteed in the Constitution. Further, the Court refused to pick out a particular activity
such as education and characterize it as fundamental.4 9 From the conclusions the Court had reached about wealth discrimination and education's characterization as a fundamental interest, it was clear that the
state did not have to show a compelling state interest to justify the continuation of its school financing scheme. The state was only required
to meet the traditional standard of review when a statute was challenged on the basis of an equal protection claim. The Court found
that the scheme bore some rational relationship to a legitimate state
50
purpose.
A challenge to a state financing scheme similar to the one upheld
in Rodriguez is foreclosed under the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. However, the Supreme Court's decision does not
preclude all legal challenges to financing schemes because suits can be
filed under state law.
State Equal ProtectionClauses
In the Serrano51 opinion, the California Supreme Court based its decision, in part, on the state constitution. The court concluded -that the
financing scheme would be unconstitutional on state equal protection
grounds where a fundamental interest was involved, if the state could
not show any compelling state interest for the financing scheme.
These were the grounds that were rejected in Rodriguez. However,
unlike the Federal Constitution, the California constitution specifically
places the responsibility for education on the state. As Justice Powell
pointed out in Rodriguez, it was the failure of the Constitution to explicitly refer to education that was fatal to the plaintiffs' contention that
education was a fundamental interest.5 2 Because of the reference to
education, and because the state equal protection clause requires a
48. Id. at 25-28.
49. Id. at 31.
50. Id. at 40. For a more detailed discussion of Rodriguez and the implications the
case has for school finance, see Kirp, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: Chaotic, Unjust-and Constitutional; Liebmann, Local Discretion and Common
Sense Affirmed; Yudolf, The Politics of Futility; Silard, School Finance Equalization:the
Beat Goes On; Sugarman, Rebound: Issues for the Future; Dimond, Reed, Rodriguez
and Retarded Children; Taylor, Avoiding the "Thicket," 2 J.L. & EDuc. 461 (1973);
Areen, Ross, Rodriguez Case: Judicial Oversight of School Financing, 1973 Sup. CT.

REV. 33 (1973).
51.

5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).

52.

411 U.S. at 35.
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demonstration of a compelling state interest when a fundamental interest is involved, the state supreme court found the financing scheme unconstitutional without resort to the Federal Constitution. Other states
could follow this reasoning if their constitutions place the responsibility
for education on the state, and contain equal protection clauses requiring the demonstration of a compelling state interest when a fundamental interest is involved.5" It appears that the Illinois Supreme
Court has not yet considered the concept of fundamental interest with
respect to the state's equal protection clause.5 4 An argument can be
made that a suit brought under this equal protection clause might prove
successful. Further, there is a specific reference to the state's responsi-

bility for providing public school education in the Illinois constitution. 55
"Thorough and Efficient" Type Clauses
Another type of challenge, also based on the educational provisions
of a state constitution, has proven successful. In Robinson v. Cahill,56
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the statutes providing for public school funding were unconstitutional.57 In a narrowly worded opin-

53. Note, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: A Study of Alternatives Open to State Courts, 8 U. OF SAN FRAN. L. REv. 90, 98-99 (1973).
54. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws."
55. ILL. CONST. art. 10, § 1 provides:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be other free education as the General
Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public
education.
56. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
57. Id. at 493, 303 A.2d at 283. The trial court had found that pupils were discriminated against on the basis of local district property wealth and taxpayers suffered
because of unequal tax burden. The lower court's finding that the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution had been violated was reversed on the basis of the
Rodriguez decision. The state supreme court rejected the holding that the state equal
protection clause of the New Jersey constitution had been violated. The taxpayer's aspect of the suit was also reversed.
The supreme court feared that a finding that the state equal protection clause had been
violated would have dire results for the entire structure of local government. Education
is financed in the same manner as many other services. The court said that since all
services are financed by the local tax base, there will always be a difference of expenditures between residents of different districts. If this constituted classification according
to wealth and was constitutionally suspect then the political structure of local government would be fundamentally changed.
In considering whether education was a fundamental value, the court stated it would
be difficult to say only education deserves equal protection. Simply because the state
chose to provide the service does not make it fundamental.
Conceding that education might be fundamental and wealth a suspect classification,
the court found that the state's purpose of giving local districts a voice in public education was a compelling interest.
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ion, the court held that the financing scheme violated the state constitutional provision which required the maintenance of a "thorough and
efficient system of free public schools." 58 In examining the New Jersey system of school finance, which was largely based on local property
taxation, the court concluded that "on its face the statutory scheme has
no apparent relation to the mandate for equal education opportunity"
because of the discrepancies in dollars spent per pupil.5 9
Though no suit has been brought on this ground in Illinois, this
method of attack might prove successful, if the Illinois Supreme Court
accepted the reasoning of Robinson. Article 10 of the Illinois constitution requires the state to "provide for an efficient system of high quality
public educational institutions and services." 60 This clause can be reasonably interpreted in the same way that the New Jersey Supreme
Court interpreted the "thorough and efficient" clause of the educational provision of the New Jersey state constitution.
"PrimaryResponsibility" Type Clause
The educational provisions of the Illinois constitution provided the
basis for another challenge to a school financing scheme. In Blase v.
State,6 ' a suit for a declaratory judgment was brought under these provisions. The plaintiffs contended that the clause, "the State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education," 2
meant that the state must provide at least 50 percent of the funds necessary to finance the public schools. 3 The defendants, officials of the
Illinois school system and the State of Illinois, responded that the clause
was simply a goal and did not have binding force. 6" The trial court
dismissed the complaint which then was appealed directly to the Illinois
65
Supreme Court.
In his brief on appeal, one of the plaintiffs argued that the constitutional history demonstrated that the plaintiffs' interpretation of the educational provisions was the correct one.6 6 The plaintiff excerpted parts
Cf. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en banc,
461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972). The court of appeals held that to provide a particular

municipal service to one part of the town but not to the other was a denial of equal
protection.

58.

62 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.

59.

Id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 296.

60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

65.

ILL. CONST. art. 10, § 1.

55 Ill. 2d 94, 302 N.E.2d46 (1973).
ILL. CONST. art. 10, § 1.

55 111. 2d at 96, 302 N.E.2d at 47.
Id.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 302(b) (1973).

After a notice of appeal is filed

with an apnellate court, the supreme court may order a direct appeal if the public interest
requires prompt adjudication.

66.

Brief for Appellant at 10-32.

The plaintiff raised several other issues: that the
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of the constitutional debates to show that the clause was not simply a
goal but was meant to have binding effect. In speaking against the
adoption of this provision, one of the constitutional convention delegates said:
Now, this may be a hortatory statement and may not but I
know what it says and primary to me means first, and if the
State has the primary responsibility
they will be responsible for
67
paying over half the costs.
Since the central issue was the intent of the constitutional convention
delegates, the thrust of the state's brief went to whether the state was
required to pay over half the costs of financing the school system. The
state argued that it was the "express intent and conscious decision" 8
of the delegates to adopt hortatory language which was not legally binding. The statement of the chief sponsor of the clause was quoted in
the state's brief:
I concede that the language I have put down is, in the Convention's usual fashion, hortatory. I do not believe that it states a legally enforceable duty on the part of the state through the General Assembly or otherwise.
I do not intend that it states a le69
gally enforceable duty.
After determining that the question was justiciable and finding that
one of the plaintiffs, the Cook County Superintendent of Schools, had
no authority to sue his superior, the Illinois Supreme Court turned to
the merits. In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the court
stated:
In view of the history of the proposal and the repeated explanation of its principle sponsor, it cannot be said that the sentence
in question was intended to impose a specific obligation on the
General Assembly. Rather its purpose was to state a commitment,
a purpose, a goal. 70
Based on the court's statement, it would seem that any further challenge brought under this provision of the Illinois constitution would be
fruitless.
words of the constitution should be given their plain meaning; that the phrase in the
education provision about primary responsibility meant that the state must contribute
more than 50 percent of the educational funds; and that one of the defendants, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, had conceded previously that the constitution required
the state to assume the major burden of financing the public school system.
67. Id. at 28.
68. Brief for Appellee at 10. In another part of its brief, the state refers to the
plaintiff's argument that the state must provide 50 percent of the funds for education.
According to this contention, it could be argued that once the state supplies this percentage of funds it would be relieved of any further financial responsibility. However, a
"modem financing scheme may in fact entail almost 100% state revenues." Id. at 17.
69. Id. at 11.
70. 55 IM. 2d at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 49.

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 6: 110

Summary of PartI
Though judicial challenge is now precluded on the federal level, attacks can be based upon various provisions of state constitutions.
Three possible alternatives have been discussed. First, a state equal
protection challenge can be attempted. Second, a system may be declared unconstitutional for failing to be "thorough and efficient."
Third, though this challenge has previously failed, a state may have to
change its funding scheme if its constitution requires the state to assume the primary responsibility for financing education.
PART

III:

LEGISLATIVE REFORM AFTER RODRIGUEZ

Whether or not a judicial challenge will succeed may not be as important today as it was five years ago. Legislatures across the country
are starting to overhaul educational financing schemes. Nevertheless,
reform will not come easily to many states. Most proposals call for
an increase in funding at a time when many state governments are retrenching financially. Further, there will be difficulty in building the
broad based coalitions that will be needed to enact the necessary legislation. Crucial allies would be those school districts of average wealth,
but such districts have little to gain from substantive reform unless the
overall level of spending is substantially increased. Furthermore, in
any conflict between rich and poor school districts in the legislature,
it is not likely that the districts of average wealth would side with the
poor. Any additional state funding will go to the poorer districts; thus,
the districts of average wealth will not benefit financially by this politi71
cal alliance.
In the final part of this article, various types of legislative reforms
which have been suggested for adoption in Illinois will be examined.
The focus will be on a discussion of alternative approaches to distributing revenue. Finally, the new revenue distribution scheme in Illinois
will be analyzed. Any revenue distribution scheme which requires the
expenditure of funds beyond the current levels of funding will necessitate the adoption of additional taxes to raise this money. However, it
is not within the scope of this article to discuss alternative revenue rais72
ing schemes.
71. Coons, Financing Public Schools after Rodriguez, SATURDAY REVIEW, October 9,
1973, at 45 [hereinafter cited as Coons].
72. For a discussion of sources of revenue in Illinois, see REvENuE SOURCES, supra
note 17 and ILLINOIS BuREAU OF THE BUDGET, REPORT ON LOCAL INCOME TAXES 2728 (1972).
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Historically, there have been three solutions to the disparity of
wealth among school districts. First, school districts have been reorganized and consolidated to create districts more equal to one another
in terms of taxable wealth.73 Second, various equalization formulas
have been devised. These formulas attempt to distribute state aid inversely to local wealth. A third means to achieve equity has been full
state funding. Two recent solutions to reduce interdistrict wealth disparity are categorical aid"4 and the voucher plan. 75 This article will
not discuss all of these distribution formulas. The main justification
for limiting discussion to the equalization formulas and full state funding is that these are the most widely-debated solutions. In addition,
school district reorganization poses difficult problems regarding discontinuous and gerrymandered districts; categorical aid is a small percentage of state aid; and the voucher system touches on the separation of
church and state.
Full State Funding
The idea of full state funding has been discussed for many years,
but it was not given serious consideration as a means to solve the equity
problem until 1968.76 Since that time, the concept has gained many
adherents. 77 Full state funding requires the state to assume responsi73. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXCELLENCE, supra note 23, at 17. In 1945-46, the number
of school districts in Illinois was 11,000. By 1972, the number of districts had been
reduced to 1,092.
74. In specific areas, the state generally provides categorical aid. This program attempts to ensure the availability of certain special programs which cost more than the
regular educational programs. In Illinois, categorical assistance includes, in part, aid for
public transportation, driver education, continuing education, gifted pupils and vocational
education. The present structure of categorical assistance contributes to the already existing wealth disparity between rich and poor districts. The programs generally ignore
ability to pay and distribute aid on a flat grant basis. NEW DESIGN, supra note 18,
at 36.
75. In its most basic terms, the voucher system works in the following way. The
state provides each parent a credit or voucher. That voucher can be used at the school
of the parent's choice. Since parents can spend their educational credits in almost any
way they please, schools will be forced to compete for students. The assumption is made
that schools being forced to compete in the marketplace of free enterprise will raise the
quality of education so they will not lose students. It was developed, in part, as a response to the fiscal crisis confronting parochial schools. If all parents were entitled to
spend vouchers where they choose, this might alleviate the parochial school crisis. For
a more thorough discussion of the voucher concept, see generally Coons, Sugarman,
Family Choice In Education: A Model State System For Vouchers, 59 CAL. L. REV.
321 (1971); Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit Of The Lemon Tree, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 687 (1972); Note, Voucher Systems Of Public Education After Nyquist And
Sloan: Can A ConstitutionalSystem Be Devised?, 72 MicH. L. REV. 895 (1974).
76. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 68. The concept is generally attributed to
James B. Conant who proposed full state funding in a speech before the Education Commission of the States.
77. For example, support for full state funding has come from the President's Commission on School Finance, the New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost and
Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education, the Advisory Commission on Inter-
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bility for the collection and distribution of revenues.
Under a plan proposed for Illinois, 78 the level of state support in all
districts would be adjusted to equal the amount which the district in
the 80th percentile in terms of school expenditures now spends. The
district in the 80th percentile spends four-fifths of what the richest district in the state spends on education. No district would be precluded
from spending more than this amount. The program, costing $3.4 billion, would be implemented over a period of 3 years. Each year, $212
million would have to be raised above the current level of spending
in Illinois. To finance this increase the plan recommends that the
property tax be set at a uniform rate of $3.32 per $100 of assessed
valuation. Though this rate would increase taxes for many property
owners, the committee which drew up the plan believes that it is justified on the ground that the tax rate would be frozen. Additional
money would be raised through other, more elastic and less regressive
taxes. 79
There are several obstacles that would have to be overcome before
a full state funding plan could be implemented. The primary obstacle
would be the fear of the assumed loss of local control. School districts
would lose control over fiscal policy, but proponents of full state funding contend that these districts will retain extensive control over all
other aspects of policy-making. 80 In addition to this obstacle, there
would be the need to raise taxes or devise new ones to cover the vastly
increased costs."'
DistrictPower Equalizing
A second distribution alternative that would remove local wealth as
a variant in determining the amount of money available to a school district has been termed district power equalization. 2 The concept is
relatively simple. A district would receive state aid on the basis of the
governmental Relations, and more recently, the Superintendent's Advisory Committee on
School Finance for Illinois.
78. A subcommittee of the Superintendent's Advisory Committee on School Finance
devised this particular plan. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 67-75.
79. Id. at 72-75. The subcommittee proposed a second full state funding proposal.
The primary difference between the two plans was that the second would redistrict the
state into 100 school districts or less.

80.

Id. at 74.

Under full state funding, local communities would still have control

over 13 of 14 areas that are associated with the running of schools. Only in the area
of spending would the communities lose their control.
81. OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 1, supra note 36, at 37.
82. PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 8, at 162-244. The concept of district power equalization was devised by three University of California at Berkeley law professors. This

concept was derived from a proposal put forth by Charles S. Benson which was termed
percentage equalization.
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rate at which the community taxes itself. Since the state would provide
a table of tax rates and the corresponding amount of money produced
at a given rate,, a district could easily determine the rate necessary to
produce a certain amount of revenue. s3 For example, a district may
choose to tax at $2.00 per $100 of assessed valuation, producing $400
per pupil. At this tax rate, the state guarantees $500 so the district
will be given $100 per pupil in aid. The failure of the district to raise
$500 through local taxation does not have any bearing in this financing
scheme. Equally important, a wealthy district which produces more
than the state guarantee must turn over this additional amount to the
state. This money will be used to fund poorer districts.
In theory, district power equalizing produces the same amount of
revenue for all districts which tax at an equivalent rate. This distribution alternative has the advantage of preserving local control over
spending. 84 In some versions of district power equalizing, leeway
would be given to school districts allowing them to tax at a certain percentage above the maximum rate.8 5
This financing scheme has been criticized on a number of grounds.
In preserving the element of local control, the concept of equalizing
wealth disparities among districts might be sacrificed. The amount of
money available per pupil will depend upon the rate at which residents
of the school district are willing to tax themselves. This alternative has
the potential of eliminating disparities as to local wealth, but it is also
possible that vast differences in funding among school districts will be
perpetuated.""
In addition to its failure to guarantee equal educational opportunity,
district power equalizing is subject to other criticisms. First, the alternative tax might help increase social and geographic segregation as the
different social classes move to those areas with more advantageous tax
rates. Second, urban districts will have a difficult time taking advantage of this plan. The competing interests of non-educational services
which also draw upon the local taxes tend to keep the tax rate for education down.8 7 Third, the incentive formula might stimulate local
83. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, SUPERINTENDENT'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL FINANCE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 2, at 57 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 2].

84. Sofaer and Haje, Financing Public Education in New York State: An Analysis
of the Fleischmann Committee Report, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1973).
85. id. at 39.
86. Colman, Financing Schools and Other Public Services, 4 URBAN LAWYER 623,
636 (1972).
87. Campbell and Shalala, Resource Literature on Educational Revenues and Expenditures, THEORY INTO PRACTICE, April, 1972, at 75. Any educational plan must take
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property taxation, thus counteracting current attempts to remove that
tax as a major source of funding. Fourth, a tax effort plan would encourage districts to spend more on education to the detriment of other
non-educational services. Finally, the equalizing scheme might encourage small districts to stay in operation while professional educators
have sought to encourage small districts to consolidate with larger
ones.8 8 However, it seems that removing local wealth as the variant
which determines the amount of money a district can spend on education outweighs these disadvantages. This conclusion is reached because a plan which removes local wealth as a variant is more likely to
achieve equal educational opportunity than a plan that retains the local
wealth feature. This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that
the most important aspect of a revenue distributing scheme is the removal of local wealth as a factor. Further, it is assumed that communities will want to provide a better, and thus more expensive, education for the children if the money can be raised without imposing a
financially crippling tax burden.
Modification of the Current Aid Formula
The foundation program, which is the current aid formula for about
32 states, has been subjected to numerous criticisms. But some educators have contended that with minor modifications this formula could
solve the wealth disparity problem.89 By increasing the foundation
level and the qualifying tax rates, more money would be allocated to
poor districts and less to rich ones.9 0 One type of modification has
been recommended for use in Illinois. 9 1 The proposal would increase
the foundation level to $1,050 per pupil from the current level of $520;
the qualifying rates would be increased 92 and flat grants would be eliminated. The proposed changes would be implemented over a 3 year
into account the special costs and burdens borne by most cities. As a rule, cities have
much higher non-educational costs than suburbs or rural areas. These additional costs
have been termed municipal overburden. This allows cities to spend about 30 percent
of their budget for education compared to about 50 percent for the suburbs. The high
cost population and the older physical plant of central cities places greater demands on
general governmental services such as health, public safety, sanitation and others.
88.

6.

Hickrod, After Rodriguez-What?, THE EoUCATION DIGEST, December, 1973, at

89. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 7.
90. Id. at 7.
91. A subcommittee of the Superintendent's Advisory Committee on School Finance
devised this particular plan. Id. at 7-19.
92. Id. at 7. Elementary and secondary districts must presently tax at $0.84 per
$100 of assessed valuation unless the district has under 100 pupils, in which case it must
tax at $0.90. Unit districts currently tax at $1.08 per $100 of assessed valuation. The
recommended increases would be $1.70 for elementary and secondary districts; unit districts must tax at $3.00 to qualify for foundation aid. Id. at 7.
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period. The total increase is estimated at $345 million, which, unlike
other equalizing schemes or full state funding, could probably be financed out of the normal growth in state revenues under the present
3
tax structure.
The formula guarantees $1,050 per pupil to those districts which tax
at the qualifying rate. This provides funds for a basic level of education. Any district could spend at a higher rate than the minimum rate
giving that district more money to spend.94 The primary criticism is
that local wealth still plays a key role under this formula. The assumption made is that the formula guarantee is sufficiently high that districts
would not want to tax at a higher rate to produce more revenue. It
is likely that some districts will always want to spend more. Without
any limitations on tax rates, wealthier districts will be able to generate
more revenue, and consequently spend more per pupil, than poorer districts which cannot afford to tax at higher rates. The advantage of having a maximum tax rate is that as the cost of education increases,
wealthier school districts would seek increased overall spending from
the legislature, benefiting all districts, and not simply raise their own
tax rates. Therefore, it is only with a maximum tax rate that the goal
of equal educational opportunity can be achieved. Without a maximum rate, local wealth will continue to determine how much districts
can spend for education.
Resource Equalizer
Another distribution alternative, the resource equalizer, like district
power equalizing, will give state aid on the basis of the local tax rate.
The resource equalizer, as its name aptly indicates, attempts to equalize
the wealth of districts by guaranteeing to a district a certain amount
of assessed valuation per student, if that district taxes itself at a certain
rate.

95

In a plan recommended for Illinois,16 a resource equalizer formula
93. Id. at 7-9.
94. Id. at 10.
95. OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 2, supra note 83, at 4.
A simple mathematical expression of the resource equalizer formula is:
G =

TR(PW) [Vg-Vi]
G - Grant
TR - Tax Rate

PW-

96.

Pupils in attendance times a weighting factor to compensate for
educating more costly students
Vg - Guaranteed valuation per pupil
Vi - Local assessed valuation
A subcommittee of the Superintendent's Advisory Committee on School Finance

devised this particular plan. FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 49-57.
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has been devised which consists of three constants: the guaranteed valuation, the tax rate, and the weighting factors given to compensate for
the added cost of educating certain types of pupils. The plan recommends -that the state contribute funds which would guarantee a certain
amount of assessed valuation per pupil in every district even if the actual valuation per pupil was less. For unit districts, the guarantee
would be $42,000; for elementary districts, $64,615; and for high
school districts, $120,000.97 These figures were chosen because the
resource equalizer will increase the money many districts will receive,
but not beyond what the state could afford. 9 8 However, since these
figures are the maximum guaranteed valuation for each pupil, to receive these amounts districts must tax at $3.00 per $100 of assessed
valuation."9 The third constant involved in the resource equalizer is
the utilization of various weighting factors. Educators consider a
weighting factor for compensatory education to be one of the more important factors. 10 0
The proposed resource equalizer has several advantages over the
current state financing scheme. To some extent it will remove the individual wealth of the district as the determining factor for the amount
to be spent on education. With the increase in guarantee and the
freezing of the tax rate, the state will assume a greater percentage of
the burden of financing education. The resource equalizer will not
provide as much money to districts as full state funding, but local residents retain control over fiscal policy, which would not be found under
full state funding. The proponents of the resource equalizer acknowledged that full state funding would reduce wealth disparities among
districts more quickly, but have chosen the slower route of the resource
equalizer because of the difficulty in convincing districts to abandon
decision-making over school expenditures. 10 1
The resource equalizer suffers from many of the same criticisms that
have been leveled against the district power equalizing formula. Principally, the residents of a district may choose to tax at less than the
maximum rate. Only at the maximum rate is a district guaranteed as
much assessed valuation as any other district. As a result, the children
of this district will receive less aid. So long as decision-making is preserved at the local level, the expenditures for schools depend upon 'the
value that residents place on education.
97.

98.

99.
100.
101.

Id. at 53.
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A New Directionfor Illinois-The Resource Equalizer
In 1973, the Illinois General Assembly revamped the school financing scheme for the state. 10 2 It chose to adopt the resource equalizer
as an alternative to the foundation type program, though districts were
given the option of receiving state aid under the resource equalizer or
the revised foundation formula.10 3 The claim for state aid by the districts would be made under the formula that provides more assistance.
Fully funded, the resource equalizer guarantees $1260 per pupil to
each district that chooses to tax at the maximum rate. Since the cost
to the state will be much higher than under the old formula, the financing scheme will be phased in over a 4 year period.' 4 For that reason,
districts can only receive one-fourth of any increase in state aid that
they would be entitled to in the first year. In each succeeding year,
districts will receive another fourth of their entitlement until the program is fully funded. 10 5
During the legislative debate in the Illinois Senate, Senator Glass described what the formula would do:
I think that name very adequately and aptly describes the new
formula because it says to school districts you can have the same
resources as all the other districts in the State . . . it does require
local districts to tax themselves higher in order to get more State aid
• . . [but] it is a principle based on local effort and if districts
tax themselves at the same rates as their neighbors locally they
will have the same amount of tax dollars available for their children in their public schools as in other districts.' 0 6
The resource equalizer has been in effect for approximately 2 school
years. In theory, the formula is designed to aid those property-poor
districts which have a low assesed value per pupil. It is still too early
102.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 18-8 (1973).
103. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, LETTER FROM SUPERINTENDED BAKALIS TO COUNTY SUPERINTENDENTS at 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
BAKALiS LETTER]. The primary changes in the foundation formula give districts a .45
weighting factor for poverty level children and, in addition, funding that would amount
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104. Transcript of Senate Sessions, June 28, 1973, at 94. According to Senator
Hynes, the cost to the state would be $134 million in the first year. Over the 4 year

period, the total state commitment would increase by $761 million.

However, because

districts might tax at higher rates, entitling them to additional state aid, the total cost
might be $1 billion beyond what the state is spending for education. But, according
to the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget for Education, Richard Carlson,

the figure of $761 million was too high an estimate.

Because of the decline in enroll-
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lion in 1976 and $145 million in 1977. Letter from Assistant Director of the Bureau
of the Budget for Education, Richard Carlson, October 8, 1974 [hereinafter cited as
Carlson Letter].
105. BAKALIS LETTER, supra note 103, at 1.
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to judge whether or not the plan is accomplishing its goal as effectively
as possible. However, in the opinion of some experts, the resource
1 °7
equalizer is beginning to reduce interdistrict wealth disparities.
And, in the opinions of the author of the formula, a state senator, a
state representative who was the chief sponsor in the House of Representatives, and officials from the Office of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction and the Illinois Bureau of the Budget, the resource equalizer is a desirable alternative to the foundation program.
Professor Ben Hubbard, 08 the author of the resource equalizer,
State Representative Gene Hoffman, 10 9 and Richard Carlson,'" Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget for Education, generally
agreed that districts would choose the resource equalizer rather than
the foundation formula over the next few years because it provides
more money than the foundation program."' This will be especially
true as the guaranteed valuation increases. However, Robert Pyle, Assistant Director of the Finance and Claims Section of the Office of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI), said many districts were
already too wealthy or had too low a tax rate to utilize the resource
equalizer formula. These districts would continue to benefit from the
foundation program.' 12 Assistant Budget Director Carlson stated that
by 1977 less than 20 percent of the districts would benefit from the
113
foundation formula.
Though it is generally believed that the resource equalizer is a better
formula than the present financing scheme, there clearly are weaknesses with the new funding mechanism. Assistant Director Carlson
from the Bureau of the Budget said the resource equalizer actually aids
the wealthiest school districts in the suburban Chicago area, particularly
the wealthy high school districts, despite legislative intentions to aid
property-poor districts. 11 4 This occurs because these districts already
107. Letter from Professor Ben C. Hubbard of Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, October 8, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Hubbard Letter]. Letter from Reaves Evans
to School Finance Experts, October 4, 1974.
108. Telephone interview with Professor Ben Hubbard of Illinois State University,
Normal, Illinois, September 4, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Hubbard Interview].
109. Telephone interview with State Representative Gene Hoffman of Elmhurst, Illinois, September 6, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Hoffman Interview].
110. Telephone interview with Richard Carlson, Assistant Director of the Bureau of
the Budget for Education, Springfield, Illinois, September 4, 1974 [hereinafter cited as
Carlson Interview].
111. Hubbard Interview, supra note 108, Hoffman Interview, supra note 109 and
Carlson Interview, supra note 110.
112. Telephone interview with Robert Pyle, Assistant Director of the Finance and
Claims Section of the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Springfield,
Illinois, September 4, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Pyle Interview].
113. Carlson Letter, supra note 104.
114. Carlson Interview, supra note 110.
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tax close to the maximum rate so they will be assured the guaranteed
maximum valuation per pupil. On the other hand, many downstate
districts have low tax rates which they cannot afford to raise, so these
districts will not be able to take advantage of the maximum guarantees.
Professor Ben Hubbard from Illinois State University noted several
weaknesses in the formula. School boards are allowed to set tax rates
without the requirement of voter approval up to a certain limit. But
for elementary and unit districts that limit is less than the tax rate required to receive the maximum guarantee. This places the decision
in the hands of the voters as to whether or not to take full advantage
of the new formula. Hubbard said "[from] an educational standpoint
that's a weakness."' 1 5 Because the voters have the power to prevent
the board from imposing the maximum tax rates, unit districts are at
a disadvantage in comparison with elementary districts. Under the resource equalizer, unit and elementary districts are guaranteed comparable amounts of assessed valuation per pupil only at the maximum tax
rate. If the voters of a unit district refuse to impose the maximum tax
rate, then that district does not receive the maximum benefits under
the resource equalizer. However, in an elementary district, even if 'the
voters choose not to impose the maximum tax rate, the school board
can set higher tax rates than school boards of the unit districts. This
gives the elementary districts a financial advantage over the unit districts.
Hubbard also criticized the assessment practices throughout the state.
If a district can assess itself at a low market value, it will benefit from
the formula in comparison to a district which assesses itself at a level
which is closer to true market value. Representative Hoffman said that
the biggest problem with the resource equalizer is the lack of an equitable formula for determining assessed valuation. 1 6 As an example of
the problem, Hoffman cited the fact that Johnson County assesses its
property at 7 percent of market value while Du Page County assesses
its property at 49 percent of market value. Though the example paints
a bleak picture, there is not as much difference between counties as
Hoffman indicated. According to Assistant Budget Director Carlson,
the state applies a multiplier to assessment rates to bring counties into
rough parity. Carlson said the multiplier reduces the differences
among counties to a range of 30 to 50 percent of market value. Further, it is often the poorest districts in the state that assess at the lowest
115.
116.
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percentages of market value.' 17
Mr. Pyle, from OSPI, said that the formula allows districts too much
leeway to effectively remove expenditure disparities."" Under the resource equalizer, those districts that currently spend more than the
$1260 guarantee will not be required to limit expenditures to the guaranteed amount. Pyle said that the formula might reduce the expenditure disparity ratio from 5:1 between the richest and poorest districts
to 4:1, but the gap will never be completely closed.
Professor Hubbard defended the local leeway provisions." 9 In his
opinion, only 10 percent of the districts will spend more than $1260
per pupil. In time, the poorer districts will be equalized with the richer
ones, which is fairer than curtailing the wealthier districts' funds. However, Professor Hubbard stated that the purpose of the resource equalizer was not "intended to make sure that everyone spent the same
amount of money."' 20 The formula was designed to equalize among
districts when districts taxed equally. The Illinois General Assembly
rejected the concept of equal expenditures among districts. According
to Hubbard, an analysis of the data for the first year's operation of the
resource equalizer shows an increase in equalization among districts.
When the tax rates of districts throughout the state are considered, the
resource equalizer is achieving equalization of educational opportunity."'
Though there are weaknesses to the resource equalizer, the state is
apparently committed to this new formula in the forseeable future.
Assistant Budget Director for Education Carlson said that the formula
is going to be very costly to the state. 12 Major modifications will not
be able to be made easily because of this cost. Furthermore, Carlson
said it would be politically impossible to write an entirely new formula
that would actually hurt the rich school districts because of their influence in the legislature.
Senator Bradley Glass,' 2 3 of Northfield, Illinois, said that problems
with any new formula must be expected. He foresees refinement of the
old approach rather than the adoption of a completely new approach.
However, he also anticipates annual changes in the formula. One
117.
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120.
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change he would like to see made is the removal of the provision which
limits districts in the amount of taxes they can raise by local referendum.
CONCLUSIONS

This article has presented the many problems associated with school
financing schemes. However, there are ways to make the system more
equitable. The judiciary has been in the forefront of change. Courts
have declared school financing schemes unconstitutional on the basis
of state equal protection grounds and provisions in state constitutions
which require the maintenance of a "thorough and efficient" school system. But judicial action alone will not be sufficient to reform school
financing. Only when the legislative and executive branches become
committed to reform will wealth disparities among districts be eliminated.
There are four widely discussed plans which would distribute revenue more equitably: full state funding, modification of the foundation
program, district power equalizing and the resource equalizer. The
plan most often discussed is probably full state funding. Under this
plan, the state would assume all the costs of distributing revenue. It
appears that only full state funding can eliminate wealth disparity.
However, adoption of this alternative will prove costly, and full state
funding may mean that less money is available for non-educational
services. Another plan would modify the present foundation formula,
which is the prevalent revenue distribution scheme among the states.
The problem with this financing plan is that no matter how high the
state guarantee is set, some districts will always choose to spend more.
This additional money will be raised through local taxation so there will
always be wealth differences between districts under this plan. Two
of the alternatives depend upon the local tax effort made by a school
district. The first, district power equalizing, will guarantee a certain
amount of assessed valuation for each pupil of a district so long as it
taxes itself at a given rate. In many ways, both formulas are similar
and for that reason both have many of the same disadvantages. The
primary objectionable feature is that, unlike full state funding, there
is the possibility that wealth disparity among districts might not be eliminated. The amount of money to which a district is entitled depends
upon the tax rate which residents wish to adopt. If the tax rate is set
low, there will be wide differences in interdistrict funding.
Illinois has chosen to adopt the resource equalizer as an alternative
to its foundation program, though districts have the option to use either
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of the two programs to receive school aid. The resource equalizer,
once it is fully funded by the legislature, will provide $1260 per pupil.
The foundation program, prior to the most recent revisions, guaranteed
about $520 per pupil. The foundation formula could have been so designed to provide $1260 per pupil without the need to devise a new
formula. However, Professor Ben Hubbard, the author of the resource
equalizer, said it would have been impossible to sell the legislature on
increasing the state aid from the $520 level to the $1260 level, since,
in the past, additional funding was added in small increments.' 2 4 To
convince the legislature to drastically increase state funding, it was necessary to change the formula radically, since the legislature would only
adopt a vastly increased funded formula on the assumption that the resource equalizer would have significant advantages over the foundation
scheme.
Though many states are revamping their school financing schemes,
most educators are realizing that any of the formulas can be designed
to provide a considerable amount of state aid to poor school districts.
It is the design and subsequent manipulation of the formula that is the
key and not the particular formula adopted. The problem with most
equalization formulas, particularly the foundation plan, is that the implementation of the formula failed to conform with the original design
as a consequence of compromises by the legislative and executive
branches.' 25 Unfortunately, any of the formulas can be compromised
to the point where they no longer can effectively solve the wealth disparity problem. 12 6
Certainly the problem is complex and there is no easy solution. But
alternatives do exist to the present system which is generally conceded
to be inequitable. Whether or not the wealth disparity problem will
be solved in an equitable fashion now depends upon the state legislatures, the state judiciaries, and the people.
DOUGLAS JAMES RATHE
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